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Summary
The Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC does not 
explicitly establish an international carbon mar-
ket. Yet its Article 6 provides a legal avenue for 
the “international transfer of mitigation out-
comes”. The specific rulebooks and guidelines 
for how to utilize the options provided in Article
6 are subject of ongoing negotiations under the 
UNFCCC.
While the rulebook for international carbon 
trading under the Paris Agreement is in the 
making, some have argued that it may not be 
necessary to invest in the development of the 
necessary institutional framework. Given the 
dramatic emission cuts necessary to attain the 
Paris Agreement’s 1.5/2 °C objective, some
people argue, there is simply no room for inter-
national carbon trading.
This Policy Paper sets out to explore this hy-
pothesis. Two conditions for international car-
bon trading are established: (1) carbon trading 
is only physically possible as long as further mit-
igation potential exists; and (2) carbon is only 
economically viable as long as significant dif-
ferentials in the level of abatement costs prevail 
around the globe. 
A review of four ambitious long-term emission 
scenarios and nine sectoral low-carbon road-
maps reveals that substantial emissions and 
correspondingly substantial mitigation poten-
tial will continue to exist in 2050. Also, differ-
ences in per-capita GDP, per-capita emissions 
as well as technology diffusion rates across 
world regions suggest that also the second 
condition will continue to be met in 2050.
Unfortunately, the data available in the consid-
ered studies does not suffice to provide a relia-
ble estimate on the scale of the remaining miti-
gation potential and/or the cost at which this
potential could be realized.
Still, the analysis demonstrates that the use of
carbon markets or “international transfer of mit-
igation outcomes” is much more a political 
question than a technical or economical one.
There is no reason to believe that carbon mar-
kets will be obsolete by 2050 even if the states 
of the world succeed in implementing the Paris 
Agreement and bringing the world onto a sus-
tainable low-carbon development pathway.
Whether or not international carbon trading 
will play a role in the global effort to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change is a matter of 
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1 Introduction  
In December 2015, the Parties to the UNFCCC
agreed to a new universal international climate 
treaty: the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agree-
ment establishes a new international legal
framework to combat climate change. It stipu-
lates a new and tightened long-term goal for 
mitigating anthropogenic climate change. Par-
ties to the UNFCCC have agreed to strengthen 
their response to climate change by  
Holding the increase in the global average tempera-
ture to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that 
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts 
of climate change (UNFCCC, 2016, Art. 2.1a).
This has been further operationalized in Article 
4 of the Agreement. Parties have agreed to 
reach a peak in global emissions as soon as pos-
sible and to “achieve a balance between an-
thropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half
of this century” (UNFCCC, 2016, Art. 4.1).
This latter goal will require a fundamental trans-
formation of global energy, industrial and agri-
cultural systems. Industrialized countries will 
have to take the lead in this transformation and 
achieve net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions sooner than many developing countries 
towards the middle of the century in order to 
leave atmospheric space for less developed 
countries to catch up.
It has been argued that price-based mitigation 
instruments1 provide a tool to efficiently and  
1 In our understanding this includes all forms of carbon 
pricing, be it in the form of carbon taxes, allowance based 
market instruments like emissions trading or certification 
schemes such as the CDM.
effectively tackle climate change (see e.g. IPCC,
2014c; Schmalensee & Stavins, 2015). Typically,
the cost of climate change impacts are not re-
flected in the price of consumer products. The-
se costs are therefore referred to as ‘external 
costs’. A carbon price that reflects these costs 
can help to ‘internalize’ these costs, i.e. it makes 
them visible and allows corporations and con-
sumers to reflect them in their routine produc-
tion, investment, and consumption decision 
making. 
Furthermore, a carbon price can help to identify 
the cheapest abatement options. If carbon 
emissions can be traded, either as emission al-
lowances or as emission reduction credits, this 
creates flexibility for regulated entities – be
they nation states or corporations under do-
mestic climate change mitigation schemes – to 
attain their mitigation obligation more cost ef-
fectively in economic terms. Market-based mit-
igation instruments such as the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme and the Clean Development 
Mechanism have proved to be effective in lev-
eraging low cost GHG abatement (Bel & Joseph,
2015; Branger, Lecuyer, & Quirion, 2015; CDM
Policy Dialogue, 2012; Wråke, Burtraw, Löfgren, 
& Zetterberg, 2012).
The Paris Agreement and in particular its Article 
6 create a legal option for “international trans-
fer of mitigation outcomes”, i.e. international
carbon trading. Whether or not this option will 
be actually utilized is ultimately a political ques-
tion. It requires political will to create the nec-
essary demand for carbon units (emission al-
lowances or mitigation credits) through 
ambitious political commitments. And it re-
quires political will to use market-based instru-
ments in general – some left-leaning countries 
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At the current stage, when the rulebook for the 
international transfer and use of mitigation 
outcomes is still in the making, it is impossible 
to make predictions on the political dimension 
of international carbon trading other than pure-
ly speculative ones.
For the ongoing discussions it is nevertheless 
highly relevant to explore the physical and 
economic dimensions of international carbon 
trading. Experiences with international carbon 
trading were made in times when (low-cost) 
mitigation potential was relatively abundant.
Assuming that the Paris Agreement will be fully 
implemented, much less mitigation potential
will remain in 2050 and thereafter. Economic
theory suggests that carbon trading will be-
come obsolete in the long run, at the latest 
when greenhouse GHG emissions are phased 
out altogether. It may therefore be questioned 
whether investing in the development of the 
necessary institutional setup for international
carbon trading schemes is not worth the time 
and effort. 
Along these lines, this JIKO Policy Paper will ex-
plore the following hypothesis: Assuming we
take the Paris Agreement seriously and im­
plement it accordingly, there will be no room
left for international transfer of mitigation 
results (carbon trading) in 2050.
The paper sets out in the first order to falsify 
this hypothesis. It will do so by specifying the 
conditions for international carbon trading and 
exploring them by reviewing existing long-term 
mitigation scenarios. In the second order, the 
paper sets out to assess the remaining potential
for international transfers or mitigation out-
comes. 
The paper does not discuss, however, how the 
world has got onto a climate compatible devel-
opment pathway in the first place. Even if car-
bon trading were obsolete in 2050 – and the 
analysis shows it is most likely not – investing in 
the development of the necessary institutional 
setup for international transfer of mitigation 
outcomes may still be worthwhile. It may even
be the case that it is a conditio sine qua non for 
getting to a <2°C world in 2050.
Section 2 provides an overview of the meth-
odological approach. Furthermore, it includes a 
discussion of the physical and economic pre-
conditions for international carbon trading. The 
section also includes a brief description of the 
scenarios and roadmaps utilized for the analy-
sis. 
Section 3 analyses the selected mitigation sce-
narios and additional sectoral roadmaps and 
assesses whether and to what extent the physi-
cal and economic conditions for international
carbon trading are met or violated in the vari-
ous scenarios and roadmaps considered. While
the scenarios provide sufficient information on 
the first order question of this paper – carbon 
trading will most likely not be obsolete in 2050 
– the second order question is much more diffi-
cult to address. The scenario meta-analysis can 
only provide a rough scoping rather than an in-
depth analysis of the remaining potential for 
carbon trading.
Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis in 
the light of the above mentioned limitations 
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2Methodology and Material  
2.1 The Various Forms of Inter-
national Carbon Trading 
Different forms of carbon trading have 
emerged over the past two decades. One dis-
tinguishing criterion concerns the entities enti-
tled to trade. Emissions Trading under the Kyo-
to Protocol for example allows nation states to 
trade their endowed emission allowances 
among each other directly.
On the other hand, Emission Trading Schemes 
(ETS) have emerged under which private corpo-
rations are legally obliged to surrender one 
emission allowance or emission reduction cred-
it for each ton of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) they 
emit in their facilities. The EU ETS is the most 
prominent example. If such an ETS covers more 
than one country, mechanisms need to be in
place to reflect cross-border trades of emission 
allowances also in the national balance sheets 
after the allowances have been surrendered.
The Paris Agreement does not explicitly men-
tion “carbon trading” or “carbon markets” but 
its Article 6 provides a legal foundation on 
which a wide range of different carbon trading 
schemes could be designed (UNFCCC, 2016).
Specifically, Article 6.2 provides the option for 
member states to engage in “cooperative ap-
proaches” and to “internationally transfer miti-
gation outcomes” from one exporting country 
to another country that may use these mitiga-
tion outcomes against its nationally determined 
contribution. Moreover, in Article 6.4 a mecha-
nism under international oversight is estab-
lished “to contribute to the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and support sustain-
able development” (UNFCCC, 2016, Art. 6.4).
While the modalities and procedures of this
mechanism have yet to be developed, it is likely 
that it will take a form similar to the CDM, po-
tentially expanding and improving it (cf. Marcu,
2016).
2.2 Sources of Demand and 
Supply 
In carbon trading schemes, the amount of po-
tential permits is defined politically via a fixed
carbon budget as the amount of allowable GHG 
emissions. The price of the permits is a resulting
variable. Demand for carbon trading of the 
types relevant for this study is, hence, deter-
mined politically.2 It rests on national obliga-
tions to mitigate a country’s own GHG emis-
sions or to support other countries in doing so.
These obligations can originate from interna-
tional treaties such as under the Kyoto Protocol
or they can be self-imposed. Under the Paris 
Agreement, all countries have an obligation to 
prepare and submit “nationally determined 
contributions” and to take appropriate 
measures to implement these climate protec-
tion goals. While countries face no formal obli-
gation to actually achieve their contributions 
under international law, many countries includ-
ing the EU have taken on legally binding obli-
gations under their respective national laws. In
some cases this national obligation is (in part) 
passed onto the private sector as is the case 
with the EU ETS and other comparable 
schemes.  
2 At much smaller scale, voluntary carbon markets exist in 
which corporations or individual buyers purchase carbon 
credits in order to compensate their own emissions. This is 
typically motivated by considerations of corporate social 
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Linking of emission trading schemes and international carbon trading between private entities 
One rationale for the establishment of “cooperative approaches” under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement was to create a legal av-
enue for linking up national emissions trading schemes: for example, this could apply to linking the EU ETS with other systems such
as the upcoming Chinese ETS and/or the Korean ETS in the medium or long term. 
If two ETSs are linked, trading may occur between companies and across sectors from one country to another. These transactions
would have to be tracked and accounted for in the respective national trading systems. Any net transfers would have to be reflect-
ed as “international transfer of mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs). Linking two (or more) ETSs should lead to a levelling out of abate-
ment costs in the systems involved. Mitigation units would be transferred from the ETS with lower abatement costs to where miti-
gation is more costly. After abatement cost have arrived at similar levels on average, trading may still continue as long as cost
differentials prevail among different sectors. However, these transactions should approximately balance each other out so that no
substantial ITMOs would occur. Nevertheless, a robust accounting system would be necessary to keep track of such private transac-
tions (see also section 2.3.2).
Demand on international carbon markets is
therefore a function of the level of ambition of 
national climate protection goals. This can play 
out in two ways: (1) carbon units traded from 
abroad can be used to compensate for excess 
emissions in the country that imports them
(offsetting). (2) Countries may choose to make 
use of market-based mitigation instruments as 
a means to support other countries in mitigat-
ing their emissions; for example, developed 
countries could buy carbon credits or allowanc-
es from developing countries and count the 
expenses against their pledged financial contri-
butions3. 
But demand for international carbon trading is
not only a function of the level of ambition of 
mitigation commitments but also a function of 
the cost and availability of mitigation potential 
in importing countries, at least this is the case 
for the demand for offsetting purposes. Why 
should a country want to import mitigation re-
sults if mitigation potential is abundant at low 
cost within its own borders? 
 
3 In the Copenhagen Accord, industrialized countries 
pledged to provide an annual USD 100 billion in order to 
support mitigation and adaptation activities in developing 
countries from 2020 onwards. In Paris this pledge was reit-
erated and parties agreed to negotiate a new collective 
climate finance goal before 2025. 
Likewise, supply for international carbon trad-
ing is a function of technical mitigation poten-
tials and the level of ambition, this time in the 
exporting country. If the exporting country ex-
erts highly ambitious mitigation efforts on its 
own, a smaller share of the technical mitigation 
potential will remain available for international 
trading.
Given the essential role of politics in defining
the level of ambition of mitigation activities and 
hence determining both supply and demand, it
is impossible to make credible projections on 
the price levels on international carbon mar-
kets. However, the abatement cost in potential 
ex- or importing countries define a boundary 
for the expected price ranges.4 Supply cannot 
be cheaper than abatement costs in the export-
ing countries and demand will be zero when 
prices exceed abatement costs in the importing 
countries.
 
4 There is not one unique abatement cost in every country 
but a range of different costs for different abatement op-
tions in each country. As a matter of simplification our 
analysis will not look into the details of abatement costs in 
different sectors and technologies, but compare overall 
cost levels on an aggregate level. Trading may still occur 
between a sector Y with high abatement costs in country 


















Joint Research Centre (JRC) Greenpeace et al. Greenpeace et al. 
Model used ETP model POLES Mesap/PlaNet Mesap/PlaNet 
Regional Resolution 
28 to 39 countries and 
world regions 
39 countries and  
world regions 
10 countries and  
world regions 
10 countries and  
world regions 
GHG emissions covered 
Energy- and process
related CO2 
All GHG Energy related CO2 Energy related CO2 
Timeframe considered 2013-2050 2010-2050 2012-2050 2012-2050 
Change in energy  and pro
cess-related global emissions 
in 2050 (vs. 1990) 
35%  
(energy and process emis
sions, CO2) 
54% 
(energy and process emis
sions, GHG) /  
61%  
(energy emissions, CO2) 
79%  
(energy emissions, CO2) 
100% 
(energy emissions, CO2) 

   









Table 1: Overview and comparison of the four scenarios considered. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
Therefore, between two countries there will be
no trade of carbon units if abatement costs are 
on par. In fact, carbon trading itself is not for 
free but comes with substantial transaction 
costs, for example for monitoring emissions and 
measuring, reporting and verifying emission 
reductions. No net flows of mitigation units will 
occur as long as the price differentials between 
exporting and importing country are not big 
enough to cover also these transaction costs 
(see box “Linking of Emissions Trading 
Schemes”).
2.3 Conditions for International 
Carbon Trading 
As indicated above and as built in in any trading 
instrument that aims at a steering effect on the 
traded units, the definition of the conditions for 
carbon markets is the result of a highly political
decision-making process. Whether or not inter-
national carbon trading occurs is much more a 
question of political ambition and preferences 
then of any hard-wired natural or economic 
preconditions. In the following, we will never-
theless lay out a set of essential conditions for 
international carbon trading. As we shall
demonstrate below, these conditions are only 
violated under rather extreme conditions. On 
the other hand, even if both of these conditions 
are met, this still does not guarantee that inter-
national carbon trading occurs. However, if the-
se conditions are violated, there is no room for 
international carbon trading whatsoever.
2.3.1	 Physical Condition: 
Untapped Mitigation Potential 
Remains Available 
Carbon trading will only remain possible as 
long as mitigation potential exists. That is, GHG 
are still emitted at least in some sectors, and 
technologies exist that can abate these emis-
sions.5 
 
5 Even if no technologies exist to further reduce emissions 
per unit of a product produced, the production of that 
product can be reduced or phased out altogether. Either 
the product can be substituted with a climate friendly al-
ternative or the phase out comes at the cost of a welfare 
loss. Whether or not a country is willing to bear that loss, 
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Moreover, mitigation potential may exist in the 
form of avoided increase in future emissions, as 
long as economic growth and emission growth 
are not decoupled entirely. The mitigation po-
tential would be exhausted only if carbon-free 
technologies generally outcompete carbon-
intensive alternatives so that any future de-
mand can be expected to be met fossil-free 
even in a business as usual scenario.
Last but not least, CO2 can be sequestered for 
example in reforestation or afforestation pro-
jects, in the soil through improved agricultural
practices, or through the use of bioenergy in
combination with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS). Although a majority of the 2 °C com-
patible scenarios from the IPCC AR5 database 
entail some form of negative emissions, the 
analysis in this paper does not consider nega-
tive emissions mitigation options; mostly, be-
cause these activities typically involve a high 
degree of uncertainty with respect to the per-
manence of the mitigation result. Also data 
availability is poor. Excluding negative emis-
sions from the analysis also does not compro-
mise the analysis with respect to the research 
question (at least not the first order question).
As we shall see, significant positive emissions 
remain in nearly all scenarios considered. Add-
ing negative emissions would only increase the 
potential for international carbon trading.
This physical condition can be considered as a 
necessary condition for international carbon 
trading. Yet under what conditions would the 
physical condition for carbon trading cease to 
be met? It is violated if all abatement options 
are realized (no remaining potential to reduce 
existing emissions) and carbon-free technolo-
gies become the baseline technologies in virtu-
ally every application (no remaining potential
to avoid future emissions). 
2.3.2	 Economic Condition: 
Differentials in Mitigation Costs 
Prevail 
The existence of mitigation potential does not 
suffice to explain international carbon trading.
Instead, trading will only occur if significant 
cost differentials 6 remain between world re-
gions, sectors and / or applied technologies. If
abatement cost are on par all over the globe,
why should anyone trade mitigation outcomes? 
In this case, the costs to obtain them would be 
the same everywhere and the profit margin
would be zero.
For the subsequent analysis, the economic
condition for international carbon trading (at 
least in the context of international trade of 
mitigation outcomes as per Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement) is deemed to be violated if no sig-
nificant regional differences in the cost of 
abatement prevail.  
Even without such disparities in abatement 
costs, this does not strictly preclude a global
carbon market. Cost differentials may continue 
to exist in between sectors and technologies 
within a given country. If this is the case, private 
entities may continue carbon trading within a 
country or region. Linking these domestic mar-
kets globally can then still be beneficial in that 
it creates a bigger market including with better 
liquidity. However, this global carbon market 
would not result in significant net transfers of 
mitigation results from one country or region to 
another.
 
6 It is important not to confuse cost differentials with price 
differentials. The price is the result of demand and supply. 
While the supply-curve is co-determined by abatement 
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2.4 Comparative Scenario  
Analysis 
In order to answer the overarching research 
question of the paper, a set of global GHG 
emission scenarios will be assessed with a view
to explore whether and to what extent the nec-
essary physical and sufficient economic condi-
tions for international carbon trading are met 
and/or violated respectively.
This exercise requires scenarios that have a 
timeframe of at least until 2050 and provide a 
resolution that allows to associate emissions 
both with world regions as well as with sectors.
Due to the limited scope of the paper, the anal-
ysis will focus on energy supply (electricity and
heat) as well as the industrial sectors only . Not 
only do these sectors account for the lion’s 
share of current emissions, but also they have 
proved to be particularly suitable for carbon 
markets. For example, projects in the energy 
and industry sectors account for the vast major-
ity of projects in the CDM’s project pipeline 
while projects in the agriculture, building and 
transport sectors are relatively rare (UNEP DTU,
2016).
It is worth noting that the analysis will look at 
2050 as a single point in time only. It does not 
assess how the world embarks on a 2 °C-
compatible development pathway. Neither 
does it discuss the role of international carbon 
trading in the time before 2050.
2.4.1 Four Scenarios 
The analysis will compare the results of four
scenarios that are roughly representative to 
cover the range of 2050 GHG emissions gener-
ally deemed to be compatible with the 2 °C tar-
get. All four scenarios claim to be in line with 2 
°C but vary with regard to their projections of
2050 emissions as well as their cumulative 
emissions until 2050. This means that the sce-
narios’ probabilities of successfully limiting
global warming to 2 °C differ. The following 
four scenarios from three different studies have 
been analysed respectively (see table 1 for an 
overview and comparison of the studies and 
scenarios):
 “2DS” from “Energy Technology Perspec-
tives 2016” (IEA, 2016) 

 “2°C” from “GECO 2016 – Global Energy 

and Climate Outlook – Road from Paris” 

(JRC / European Commission, 2016) 

 “Energy [R]evolution” from “Energy 
[R]evolution – A Sustainable World Energy 
Outlook 2015” (Greenpeace, SolarPower 
Europe, & GWEC, 2015) 
 “Advanced Energy [R]evolution” from “En-
ergy [R]evolution – A Sustainable World 
Energy Outlook 2015” (Greenpeace et al.,
2015) 
None of these scenarios were explicitly mod-
elled in light of the 1.5 °C goal. However, the 
latter two scenarios from the study by Green-
peace et al. are very ambitious (maintaining 
global mean temperatures below 2 °C with rela-
tively high probability) and may therefore be
not too far from scenarios that achieve to halt 
global warming at or around 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels (albeit at a higher probability of 
exceeding the limit). The “Advanced Energy 
[R]evolution” scenario even entails a complete 
phase out of energy-related CO2 emissions in 
2050.
It is also important to note that the scenarios 
selected are all simulation-based scenarios.7 By 
contrast, optimization models typically aim to
identify a cost optimal selection of technologies 
under given constraints. This is usually done by 
applying a common endogenous carbon price.
Therefore, these models by design achieve a 
settlement of marginal abatement costs across 
the model and thus they inherently assume the  
7 The IEA scenarios combine simulation-based modelling 
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existence of market forces in the selection of 
development pathways. Building an argument 
on whether carbon markets are obsolete in
2050 on model projections that assume their 
existence would be incongruous.
2.4.2	 Cross-check with IPCC AR5 
Scenarios 
In order to provide a sense of the representa-
tiveness of the four selected scenarios, they 
were juxtaposed to those scenarios of the IPCC 
AR5 Scenario Database that reliably limit global 
warming below two 2 °C. This database con-
tains an overall of 1184 scenarios, only 114 of 
which fall into the IPCC’s most ambitious cate-
gory 1 of scenarios. These scenarios are charac-
terized by a CO2-equivalent concentration of 
430-480 ppm and cumulative total CO2 emis-
sions of <950 Gigatonnes in the year 2100 
(IPCC, 2014b).
Unfortunately, the database does not provide 
for sufficient resolution to inform the assess-
ment of the conditions for international carbon 
trading as explained above. The IPCC scenarios 
as represented in the database specify a break-
down of sectoral emissions only as a global ag-
gregate but not for each world region. Cross-
checking with the IPCC scenario database 
therefore only provides a sense of whether the 
four scenarios fall within the spectrum of 2 °C 
compatible scenarios.
2.4.3	 Other Greenhouse Gases 
The scenarios and roadmaps considered in the 
analysis are all restricted to CO2 emissions, 
some even cover only energy-related emis-
sions. Various other GHGs exist that may further
add to the abatement potential identified in the
scenarios considered.
Methane (CH4), for example, is emitted primarily 
through enteric fermentation processes by live-
stock farming, waste treatment and rice cultiva-
tion. Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are pro-
8 
 
duced in agriculture and certain industrial pro-
cesses. Various hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are 
produced for example as refrigerants or precur-
sors in the chemical industry.
It is unclear to what extent the abatement po-
tential of these GHGs will be fully realized by 
2050. For some of them, particularly the indus-
trial processes, there may be reason to be opti-
mistic that most of the abatement potential will 
be realized by then. For example, at the recent 
28th meeting of the parties of the Montreal Pro-
tocol, parties have agreed to phase down HFC 
emissions (IISD Reporting Services, 2016). On 
aggregate, however, relevant emissions prevail 
in nearly all scenarios in the IPCC scenario data-
base (IPCC, 2014a).
Although these emissions cannot be consid-
ered quantitatively in the subsequent analysis
due to lack of detailed data, this omission does 
not compromise the analysis with respect to 
the research question. Much like the exclusion 
of negative emissions (see section 2.3.1) includ-
ing non-CO2 GHGs would only increase the mit-









Author(s) Title Date Sector 
Cefic & Ecofys European chemistry for growth – Unlocking a competitive, low carbon and 
energy efficient future 
2013 Chemicals 
Cembureau The Role of Cement in the 2050 Low Carbon Economy 2013 Cement 
EUROFER A Steel Roadmap for a Low Carbon Europe 2050 2013 Iron & Steel 
IEA, DECHEMA & ICCA Technology Roadmap: Energy and GHG Reductions in the  Chemical Industry via 
Catalytic Processes 
2013 Chemicals 
IEA & WBCSD Cement Technology Roadmap 2009: Carbon emissions reductions up to 2050 2009 Cement 
Lechtenböhmer et al.  Decarbonising the energy intensive basic materials industry through electrifica
tion  Implications for future EU electricity demand 
2016 various 
WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff & DNV GL Industrial Decarbonisation & Energy Efficiency Roadmaps to 2050  Cement 2015 Cement 
WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff & DNV GL Industrial Decarbonisation & Energy Efficiency Roadmaps to 2050 – Iron and 
Steel 
2015 Iron & Steel 
WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff & DNV GL Industrial Decarbonisation & Energy Efficiency Roadmaps to 2050  Chemicals 2015 Chemicals    





Table 2: Overview of sectoral roadmaps considered for the analysis. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
2.4.4 Additional Information Required 
Only part of the information to fully explore the 
research question of this paper could be found 
in the considered scenarios. This concerns, for 
example, a more fine-grained breakdown of 
emissions of the industrial sector. The scenarios 
do not provide information of the emissions of
sub-sectors such as steel, cement, other metals, 
paper and pulp, industrial gases, or the chemi-
cal industry or do so only on the global level
but not with a regional resolution.
Also, the scenarios provide only very limited in-
formation with respect to the technologies em-
ployed in each sector, let alone the associated 
(mitigation) costs of these technologies or even 
marginal abatement cost curves.  
To make up for these deficiencies, a series of 
nine sectoral roadmaps were considered to 
provide complementary data (see table 2) (Cefic 
& Ecofys, 2013; Cembureau, 2013; EUROFER, 
2013; IEA, DECHEMA, & ICCA, 2013; IEA & 
WBCSD, 2009; Lechtenböhmer, Nilsson, Åhman,
& Schneider, 2016; Parsons Brinckerhoff, WSP & 







Figure 1: Distribution of projected global CO2 emissions of the most ambitious IPCC AR5 scenarios (category 1) by region 
(upper chart) and sector (lower chart).  The boxes indicate 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile of occurrence, with whisk

























































































































































A look into the IPCC scenario database (IPCC,
2014a) reveals that there is no scenario that 
projects a complete phase out of global GHG 
emissions by 2050 (see figure 1). The scenarios 
considered for this study fall well within the 
range of the most ambitious (category 1) IPCC 
scenarios. Only the “Advanced Energy 
[R]evolution” scenario prepared by Greenpeace 
et al. (2015) describes a pathway that leads to 
zero energy-related CO2 emissions by the middle 
of the century. However, this scenario does not 
include any other GHG emissions like those 
from industrial processes, land-use or the agri-
cultural sector. Furthermore, this scenario was 
specifically intended to outline an extreme
conceivable case.
To answer the first order research question of 
this paper, i.e. falsifying the claim that carbon 
trading will be obsolete in 2050, it can been 
stated with high confidence that the necessary 
physical condition for international carbon trad-

















Figure 2: CO2 emissions in 2050 as projected in the four scenarios, breakdown by sector. Note that the “Advanced Energy 
[R]evolution” scenario projects the complete phase out of energy related CO2 emissions. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute based on IEA (2016), JRC / European Commission (2016), and Greenpeace et al. (2015). 
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Energy transformation 
Much more difficult to answer is the second or-
der research question: What kind of emissions 
and emission reduction potentials remain in
2050? In the following, we provide an overview 
of the regional and sectoral distribution of the 
remaining emissions in the four selected sce-
narios as well as a brief outlook on the process-
es and technologies that are responsible for 
them.  
Figure 2 shows the remaining emissions in 2050 
by sector in the four scenarios. The industry sec-
tor will likely remain an important source of
GHG emissions, it is the sector with the largest
energy- and process related emissions in at 
least two of the analysed scenarios. In the “2DS” 
and “2°C” scenarios, the industry sector still 
emits between 6 and 7 Gigatonnes of CO2e by 
2050.
Note that there are methodological differences 
in the three studies that make a direct compari-
son of the results difficult. The study by Green-
peace et al. only accounts for energy-related 
CO2 emissions whereas the studies by IEA and 
JRC / European Commission include process-
related emissions in the industry sector. The 
breakdown of industry emissions which is only 
available in the JRC / European Commission 
study suggests that energy-related emissions in
industry (for example process heat), again, ac-
count for only a minor part of the sector’s total
emissions. 
All scenarios have in common that emissions 
from the energy transformation sector (electric-
ity and district-heat) are substantially reduced.
Emissions from the energy transformation sec-
tor are therefore likely to play a less important 
role by 2050, especially if carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technologies are available as a 
mitigation option.
The transport sector is expected to be another 
sector with relevant CO2 emissions, at least in 
the “2DS” and “2°C” scenarios, less so in the 
more ambitious scenarios by Greenpeace et al.
The scenarios considered by the IPCC in general 
come to a similar conclusion: apart from non-
CO2 GHG (which are not considered here), 2050 
GHG emissions are expected to stem mostly
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3.1 Sectoral Breakdown 
3.1.1 Energy Transformation Sector 
As stated above, the energy transformation sec-
tor in all scenarios is projected to be largely de-
carbonized in all world regions. The JRC / Euro-
pean Commission study assumes that by 2050 
still some 23% of global electricity demand is 
met by fossil fuels including some coal capaci-
ties. However, almost all of the remaining ca-
pacities will be used with CCS. CCS is also fore-
seen for the use of biomass so that emissions of 
the power sector in the “2°C” scenario even be-
come net negative.
Similarly, in the IEA’s “2DS” scenario only 5% of 
electricity demand is met by coal and gas with-
out CCS (and 12% with CCS power plants). The 
Energy [R]evolution scenario, despite being the 
most aggressive of the three scenarios that still 
project emissions, nevertheless predicts that 
8% of the electricity demand is met by fossil 
fuel sources, predominantly natural gas. This
can be explained by two of the central premises 
of the scenario: a quick phase out of nuclear 
power and non-utilization of CCS technologies.  
The power sector is generally expected to pro-
vide the widest and cheapest mitigation oppor-
tunities (cf. IEA, 2016, p. 69). This is why all sce-
narios project that these opportunities will be 
largely realized by 2050. Nevertheless, even the 
more ambitious scenarios still project the use of
fossil fuels without CCS in the power sector.
Abating these emissions in the end will be a 
matter of cost and not of technical feasibilities. 
Figure 3, below, suggests that the deployment 
rate of CCS technologies, alongside other fac-
tors such as the availability of suitable storage 
sites, may depend on the developmental state 
of the host country.
n.a. 












































Figure 3: Share of emissions avoided in natural gas power 
production through the use of CCS by world region as pro-
jected by the “2DS” scenario. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute based on IEA (2016). 
3.1.2 Industrial Sector 
As stated above, emissions from the industrial
sector include both energy-related emissions 
and process-emissions, i.e. emissions originat-
ing inter alia from chemical reactions in the 
production process. A comparison of the three 
studies is difficult because each study takes on 
a different approach. The IEA aggregates both 
types of emissions, the study by JRC / European 
Commission provides separate data on both 
types of emissions, and Greenpeace et al. only 
consider energy-related emissions.  
A breakdown of industrial emissions in the 
“2DS” scenario with respect to the most emis-
sion intensive sub-sectors is provided in figure 
4 below. The chemicals, cement, and iron and 
steel sub-sectors remain the largest industrial
polluters despite realizing substantive and in
fact the largest absolute emission cuts of all in-











































Figure 4: Shares of industrial emissions in 2050 in the 
“2DS“-scenario by sub-sector. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute based on IEA (2016). 
Chemicals and Petrochemicals 
Sectoral roadmaps show that the technical mit-
igation potential in the chemical industry may 
be substantially larger than projected in the 
“2DS” and “2°C” scenarios. According to a study 
by Cefic and Ecofys (2013), emissions of the (Eu-
ropean) chemical industry can technically be
reduced to 90% below 2010 levels with a com-
bination of incremental improvements (energy 
efficiency measures, fuel switch, N2O abatement 
and decarbonisation of power supply) and 
heavy use of CCS.8 This is in line with the find-
ings of a study carried out for the UK, which 
likewise estimates that emission reductions of 
80-90% below 2012 levels may be technically
possible (Parsons Brinckerhoff, WSP & DNV GL,
2015b).
Both of these studies do not even consider oth-
er “breakthrough” technologies such as the uti-
lization of electrolytic hydrogen, synthetic me-
thane or carbon reuse (circular economy).
Particularly the use of hydrogen can further re-
duce carbon emissions from the sector (cf.
Lechtenböhmer et al., 2016).
 
8 According to the study, this would require CO2 prices of 
EUR 200-300 per tonne CO2.
Iron and Steel 
The “2DS” scenario estimates that by 2050 CO2 
emissions from the iron and steel sector can be 
reduced by as much as 66% below 2013 levels.
This finding is supported also by a sectoral
study focusing on steel production in the UK 
(Parsons Brinckerhoff, WSP & DNV GL, 2015c).
However, in both studies CCS is applied only to 
a limited extent due to high expected costs.
Moreover, both studies again do not take into 
account potential “breakthrough” technologies.
A study by EUROFER (2013) lists a number of 
such technologies that currently are at various 
stages of development but may be technically 
available before 2050. The most ambitious of 
those technologies is alkaline electrolysis of 
iron ore. This technology would virtually elimi-
nate direct process emissions. If 100% renewa-
ble electricity is used, this process could slash 
carbon emissions by as much as 98% even 
without CCS. 
Cement 
In the cement sector it is particularly difficult to 
cut specific CO2 emissions since the lion’s share 
of emissions are process-related and originate 
from the calcination of limestone. The only so-
lution in this case would be to substitute lime-
stone as a raw material. However, no proven al-
ternatives exist to date that could be 
introduced at the required scale (Lechtenböh-
mer et al., 2016). Consequently, most sectoral 
roadmaps estimate that emission reductions in
the range of only 30% below 1990 levels are 
possible in 2050 without the use of CCS
(Cembureau, 2013; IEA & WBCSD, 2009; Parsons 
Brinckerhoff, WSP & DNV GL, 2015a). The “2DS”-
scenario only estimates emission reductions of 
32% below 2013 levels even including CCS. In
contrast to that, Cembureau (2013) projects 
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3.1.3 Transport 
The largest share of the remaining emissions in 
2050 as projected by the scenarios result from
the transport sector. The sector is and remains 
the largest source of demand for oil. One key 
abatement option is the increasing electrifica-
tion of the sector. However, the scenarios con-
sidered (again with the exemption of the “Ad-
vanced Energy [R]evolution”) do not project a 
complete substitution of oil-based transport.
The share of electric vehicles is projected to in-
crease substantially only for light vehicles, yet 
all studies (except again “Advanced Energy 
[R]evolution) project that their share will not
exceed 50% of final energy consumed in the 
sector. The share is substantially lower in all 
scenarios for heavy duty vehicles as well as in 
aviation and maritime transport. Even the Ad-
vanced Energy [R]evolution scenario achieves 
zero emissions only by assuming the heavy use 
of synthetic fuels and liquid biomass. The latter 
scenario demonstrates that technically, a large 
mitigation potential remains in the transport 
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3.2 Regional Breakdown 
In all scenarios, absolute 2050 GHG emissions 
are highest in China, followed by India. Howev-
er, the EU and the USA also still have relevant 
emissions by then. A sectoral breakdown of 
these emissions is provided by the “2°C” scenar-
io (see figures 5). 
From this regional distribution of emissions 
however, one cannot yet conclude on differ-
ences in regional levels of abatement costs. As 
stated above, such cost differentials are essen-
tial for international transfer of mitigation out-
comes to occur (at least as a means to offset 
mitigation obligations in the importing coun-
try). Unfortunately, none of the considered sce-
narios provides cost data of sufficient detail to 
explore this question in depth. Still, the scenar-
ios do provide us with some leads which we are 
going to explore in the remainder of this sec-
tion.
Figure 5: 2050 CO2 emissions by region in total a) and by sector: b) energy transformation [Use of BECCS explains nega-
tive emissions], c) industry, d) buildings, e) agriculture, and f) transport.






















































































































































































(Advanced) Energy [R]evolution 
Figure 6: Per capita gross domestic product in 1000 USD (2005) in purchase power parities of selected world regions. 
Values include actual data for 2010 and scenario assumptions for 2050 from all three studies. Note that Greenpeace et al. 















































Scnario "2°C" (EC 2016) 
Scenario "2DS" (IEA 2016) 
Lukas Hermwille and Sascha Samadi 
One very generic assumption is that, all else be-
ing equal, mitigation should be cheaper in less 
developed regions. The argument supporting 
this claim is that it should be easier to build up 
low carbon infrastructure from scratch than re-
placing existing high-carbon infrastructure, es-
pecially when this high-carbon infrastructure 
has to be discarded before the end of its sched-
uled lifecycle (stranded assets). 
If we take this premise for granted, two particu-
lar indicators from the scenarios may lead us 
closer to an answer: per capita GDP (in pur-
chase power parities) and per capita emissions.
Figures 6 and 7 show that significant disparities 
in the state of development prevail in 2050 in 
all scenarios. 
The scenarios concur with regard to the differ-
ences in per capita CO2 emissions by world re-
gion in 2050: In all three scenarios that still re-
port emissions by 2050, per capita emissions 
are expected to be higher than the global aver-
age in Europe and especially in the USA (North 
Figure 7: Per capita emissions in selected world regions as projected by the “2°C” and “2DS” scenarios. 
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America), China and Russia (Eastern Eu-
rope/Eurasia), also in the Middle East in two of 
the scenarios. Per capita emissions are expected 
to be lower than the global average in Africa. 
However, notable differences exist in regard to 
India.
The differences in per capita CO2 emissions be-
tween the world regions are significant in all
three scenarios: For example, in the USA in the 
“2°C” scenario, emissions are about six times 
higher than in Africa. In the “2DS” scenario, per 
capita emissions are almost three times as high 
in Russia compared to Brazil. In the “Energy 
[R]evolution” scenario, energy-related CO2 
emissions in Eastern Europe/Eurasia are almost 
7 times higher than in Africa.
These findings again correspond with the IPCC 
scenarios. Of those scenarios in the IPCC data-
base that specify regional per capita emissions,
only two scenarios (both applied in the Phoenix 
2012 model) achieve equalization of per capita 
emissions. The mean difference between the 
highest and lowest regional per capita emis-
sions of the most ambitious scenarios in the 
IPCC AR5 scenario database (category 1) is 2.27 
tonnes, the maximum difference is 5.73 tonnes 
(IPCC, 2014a).
It is therefore safe to say that significant differ-
ences in the material wealth will prevail at least 
until 2050. These differences imply a higher ca-
pacity to pay for mitigation technologies. In the 
absence of a carbon market that would allow
for a levelling of abatement across the globe, it 
can be assumed that more expensive mitiga-
tion options will be explored first in more pros-
perous world regions.
This argument is also supported by differences 
in the diffusion rates of particular mitigation 
technologies. Unfortunately, this kind of infor-
mation is extremely scarce in the reviewed 
studies. The only exemption is information with 
respect to the diffusion of CCS technologies.
The IEA study does provide some data on this
aspect. Figure 3 above indicates that in natural 
gas based power production, virtually all re-
maining generation capacity is projected to be 
equipped with CCS technology in the US, Russia 
and the EU, whereas for India, China and other 
South-East Asian (ASEAN) countries below 20%
of emissions from natural gas power produc-
tion are avoided with CCS. Similar disparities 
are present when it comes to CCS in the indus-
trial sector (see figure 8 below).
Figure 8: Share of emissions avoided through the use of 
CCS in the industry sector as projected by the “2DS“-
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4Discussion  
The scenario meta-analysis allows us to con-
clude with respect to the first order question of 
this study: there is no reason to believe that 
carbon trading will be obsolete in 2050 on eco-
nomic or physical grounds.
Reliable estimates with respect to the second 
order problem this study addresses – the ex-
tent, volume or even expected costs of the re-
maining international carbon trading potential
– are much more difficult. The analysis faces 
some fundamental problems. At the core is a 
lack of detailed sectoral and regional data in the 
existing literature. Existing energy and emission 
scenarios do not provide a level of detail to 
come to a definitive answer with respect to our 
research question providing data on the physi-
cal and economic potential for carbon markets 
in the future. 
Most importantly, the scenarios do not specify 
emissions separately for industrial (sub-)sectors 
for the different world regions and they provide 
little information on abatement costs. Some
studies do not even show a breakdown of GHG 
emissions from industrial sub-sectors at the 
global level. Moreover, process-related emis-
sions are not considered by all studies.
The analysis is further hampered by the fact 
that the existing studies focus on particular CO2 
mitigation options in 2050 and do not discuss 
mitigation potential and/or cost of those op-
tions that have not been considered or that 
may become available only later on. Even for 
those technologies that have been considered,
no detailed information on abatement costs are 
provided, generally.
Of course, the studies should not be blamed for 
this, since they all set out to answer very differ-
ent research questions. Furthermore, the avail-
ability of advanced “breakthrough” technolo-
gies is highly speculative, let alone speaking of 
cost and deployment rates across the globe.
To mitigate this problem, we have reverted to a 
series of sectoral roadmaps. While these may 
provide a more detailed insight into the respec-
tive sectors, it may come at a cost: It is unlikely 
that those sectoral studies built on similar as-
sumptions with respect to what technologies 
are likely to be utilized before 2050 as com-
pared to the global scenario studies. Unfortu-
nately, the lack of detail in the scenario studies 
does not allow for a direct comparison. Still, the 
differences in the realized mitigation potential
suggests that differences exist.
Nevertheless, the analysis allows to conclude 
that even in 2050 there is ample mitigation po-
tential left, if breakthrough technologies such 
as CCS or other technologies that have yet to 
be fully developed or scaled up (including hy-
drogen production by electrolysis) are taken in-
to account. From today’s point of view it is,
however, uncertain whether and at what costs 
these technologies will mature to realize 
abatement that achieves the levels of the more 
ambitious scenarios or, in the light of the 1.5 °C 
goal, even exceed them. One could even go so 
far as to say that it seems unlikely that this will 
happen in the absence of a sufficiently high 
carbon price.
Despite these shortcomings, the results of the 
study are quite clear. Every lead points in the 
same direction: there will still be ample room
for international transfer of mitigation results 
even in 2050. All sectors we have looked at still 
feature substantial emissions in 2050. However,
in the energy transformation sector, a sector 
which is considered particularly suitable for 
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number of large point sources, has relatively lit-
tle to offer in terms of remaining emissions. 
While some mitigation potential is predicted for 
the industrial sector, which comprises large 
point sources of GHGs as well, it may be neces-
sary that carbon trading will have to revert to 
sectors and emissions that are more difficult to 
capture with existing tools and methodologies 
of measuring, accounting and verifying emis-
sions or emission reductions.
The scenario comparison also reveals that sig-
nificant disparities in the regional distribution 
of wealth and emissions will prevail in 2050. 
This allows to conclude that there is room, both 
economically as well as technologically, to shift 
emissions from one world region to another. In
other words: there is room for carbon trading in
2050.
All things considered, there is no reason to be-
lieve that there is no room for carbon markets 
by the middle of the century or that they be-
come obsolete by then in a scenario of very 
ambitious global climate change mitigation ef-
forts. Quite the contrary, a form of carbon pric-
ing may be necessary to achieve those ambi-
tious goals in the first place. One feature of 
market-based mitigation instruments is the so-
called “search function” of carbon markets: put-
ting an effective price on carbon through emis-
sion trading (or alternatively a carbon tax) en-
gages new actors to seek rents by identifying 
and most importantly realizing low-cost mitiga-
tion options. Additional revenues can help to 
overcome technical or institutional barriers e.g.
by directing the attention of managers and en-
gineers.
Last but not least, it is difficult to imagine how a 
levelling of abatement costs on the globe can 
be realized without harnessing market forces.
Levelling abatement costs is equivalent with 
realizing the cheapest mitigation potentials 
first. While carbon markets certainly are no sil-
ver bullet that can resolve the climate crisis 
alone, they help to optimize the use of scarce 
resources and thus enable spending on other 
climate protection purposes including on adap-
tation that are less prone to market forces. 
The analysis also reveals that, ultimately, the 
use of carbon markets or “international transfer 
of mitigation outcomes” is much more a politi-
cal question than a technical or economical
one. It is political in at least two ways: Are coun-
tries willing to make use of markets in general? 
And do countries, in particular the industrial-
ized countries, take on ambitious mitigation 
commitments, commitments that are in line 
with their historic responsibility or in fact any 
measure of equity? The remaining disparities in
per-capita-emissions in 2050 (see figure 6) indi-
cate that industrialized countries, in order to do 
their fair share, need to compensate their high-
er-than-average emissions by supporting miti-
gation in lesser developed countries. Interna-
tional transfer of mitigation outcomes is one 
potentially important tool to organize this con-
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5Conclusions  
This Policy Paper set out to investigate whether 
any claims that “if we take the Paris Agreement 
seriously, there is no room for carbon markets” 
or “carbon markets will be obsolete in 2050” are 
substantiated. Two conditions have been iden-
tified that would technically preclude any in-
ternational carbon trading: (1) no mitigation 
potential remains and/or (2) no differences in
the cost of the remaining abatement options 
remain. The first of the two conditions needs no 
explanation. The second is based on the follow-
ing rationale: if cost are on par across the globe,
why should one country invest in mitigation ac-
tivities abroad when it can achieve the same
within its own borders? 
Three studies comprising a total of four scenar-
ios have been reviewed. Despite some short-
comings in terms of the level of detail of the da-
ta provided by these studies, it can be safely
concluded that none of the above mentioned 
conditions is very much likely to be violated in
2050. The only exemption is the “Advanced En-
ergy [R]evolition scenario by Greenpeace et al.
(2015) which foresees a complete phase-out of 
energy related emissions by 2050 (process re-
lated emissions are not covered in the scenar-
io). This extremely ambitious scenario can serve 
as an interesting reference point. It demon-
strates that a full phase-out of emissions seems 
technically possible (even if possibly at ex-
tremely high cost). From here it can be inferred 
that the technical mitigation potential remains 
in all other scenarios. 
Also, all scenarios document significant dispari-
ties in the distribution of global wealth and 
emissions. This can be interpreted as a strong 
indicator that the second condition is not vio-
lated either. All scenarios that still feature emis-
sions in 2050 concur that industrialized coun-
tries in Northern America and Europe will still 
feature per-capita-emissions above the global
average, in some scenarios very substantially 
above average. If these countries would like to 
contribute their fair share to the global climate 
change mitigation effort – however this share is 
defined – they will have to assume responsibil-
ity for emission reductions elsewhere. Interna-
tional carbon trading and the international
transfer of mitigation outcomes can be one tool
to organize this compensation cost effectively.
The political aspects of international carbon 
trading, though, were beyond the scope of this 
Policy Paper. From our scoping we can con-
clude that technically and economically there is
no reason to believe that carbon trading will be 
obsolete in 2050. Due to the limited space and 
the imperfect data provided in the consulted 
studies, they do not allow us to make any fur-
ther conclusions on the scale or volume of po-
tential international transfers of mitigation out-
comes nor the price levels at which this may (or 
may not) occur. 
To address these questions, further research is
required in at least two directions. First, it
would be necessary to investigate the political
dimension of carbon markets: with respect to 
estimating potential demand for international
carbon trading, it would be interesting in par-
ticular to compare the projected (per-capita) 
emissions in industrialized countries and their 
fair share according to a range of different equi-
ty indicators. 
Second, a dedicated modelling exercise could 
provide data that is not available from the third 
party scenarios considered in this study and 
that would enable a much more sophisticated 
estimate of potential supply. This relates partic-
ularly to data with respect to a detailed sectoral 
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sions and emission reduction potentials, diffu-
sion rates of key low-carbon technologies, as 
well as expected abatement cost levels in the 
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